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Abstract  
In this paper we investigate how the interaction between the product and the emission 
permit markets may affect firms’ propensity to adopt cleaner technologies. The 
adoption of a cleaner technology has the direct effect of reducing the compliance cost 
of the firm, but it also involves a strategic decision, if the industry is not perfectly 
competitive. We look at this problem from both a theoretical and an experimental point 
of view. We develop a model of duopoly, in which two firms engage in quantity 
competition in the output market and behave as price takers in the permit market. 
Firms have the possibility of investing in a cleaner production technology, which is 
available on the market at some cost. We set up a dynamic game over an infinite 
horizon in order to investigate firms’ investment decisions: in each period, each firm 
decides whether to invest in the new technology or not. The stationary equilibria to this 
game crucially depend on both the cost of switching to the cleanest technology and the 
emission cap. Technology diffusion is one of the possible equilibria of the game. In 
order to test the predictions of the theory, we design and implement an “innovation 
experiment” that replicates the “innovation game”. The results of our pilot experiment 
suggest that firms’ behaviour will eventually lead to innovation diffusion. 
 
Key Words: tradable permits, technology adoption, oligopoly, laboratory experiments. 
JEL Categories: C91, L13, O30, Q28 
 
1 Introduction  
One central concern of environmental policy is how it can stimulate innovation and 
diffusion of cleaner technologies. Alternative environmental policy instruments can have 
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significantly different effects on the rate and direction of technological change. Most of 
the literature concerning the effect of environmental policy on cleaner technology 
innovation and diffusion has focused on comparing different policy approaches. There is 
an almost general agreement that market-based instruments are superior to command-
and-control regulation in this respect (Denicolò, 1999; Downing and White, 1986; Fisher 
et al. 1998, Jung et al., 1996; Milliman and Prince, 1989), though these studies provide 
different conclusions about which of these market-based policies is the most effective in 
inducing an “environmental technological change”. Nonetheless, emission trading is 
claimed to be one of the most effective instruments for pollution control, both in a static 
context and in the long run.  The theoretical arguments have led to a growing interest in 
the possible applications of this policy, both at national and international levels; this 
interest is also due to some successful applications, mainly in the US.  
Nonetheless, only a few studies have dealt with how an emission trading scheme has to 
be designed in order to induce innovation1 (Laffont and Tirole, 1996). What are the 
variables that affect firms’ technology choice under an emission trading scheme? In this work, 
we would try to answer this question, focusing on the variables that the environmental 
regulator may adjust in order to incentive polluters to shift to a cleaner technology.  
Moreover, there is little rigorous evidence concerning the ability of tradable permits to 
incentive innovation and adoption of cleaner technologies, mostly because of the scarcity 
of available data (Jaffe et al., 2002). This observation has led us to adopt the 
experimental approach to analyse firms’ technology choice. Do laboratory subjects decide 
to innovate as theory predicts? 
As it has been pointed out in some studies (Fershtman and deZeew, 1995; Montero, 
2002; Requate, 1998), considering only the allowance market may lead to biased 
conclusions, since the adoption of a cleaner technology has a direct cost-reducing effect 
internal to the firm, but also implies strategic effects arising from the interaction between 
the output and the permit markets. For this reason, we depart from the competitive 
assumption, explicitly considering the production decision in a Cournot duopoly, where 
the technology is modelled in terms of emissions per unit of output, rather than in terms 
of abatement cost. We focus on the effect of the interaction between the output and the 
permit markets on the diffusion of the new technology, i.e. we look at the conditions 
                                                 
1 For example, Laffont and Tirole (1996a and 1996b) claim that future markets of permits provide higher 
incentives to innovate than do spot markets.     4
under which one or both firms are induced to invest in a new technology and thus on  
what it is possible to do to make diffusion more likely.  
In order to analyse the incentives to innovate in the long run, we set up a dynamic game: 
in each period, each duopolist has to decide whether to invest in the new production 
process or not, on the basis of the profits they can earn during their whole life, which we 
assume to be infinite. We solve the game looking for a stationary symmetric equilibrium, 
which may involve mixed strategies. We find that this game leads to multiple stationary 
equilibria, which crucially depend on the cost of switching to the cleanest technology and 
on the emission cap. In particular, one of these possible outcomes consists in both firms 
adopting the most efficient technology (diffusion outcome). Nonetheless, it is not possible 
to predict which outcome will actually occur. An experimental investigation can help us in 
seeing this. We design and implement an “innovation experiment” that replicates the 
“innovation game”. Our aim is to see whether subjects tend to converge to a specific 
equilibrium among those that have been identified in the theoretical analysis.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section we develop a model of 
duopoly, and we determine how the permit  price and the per-period profits change when 
firms move to a cleaner technology. In section 3, we model firms’ strategic decision of 
adopting a cleaner production technology as a dynamic “innovation” game. Section 4 
describes  the experiment that was implemented to test the predictions of the theoretical 
model. The final section concludes, drawing some lessons for environmental policy 
design. 
 
2 The Model 
We consider two profit-maximising firms producing a homogeneous good and competing 
à la Cournot in the output market. Let  i y  be firm i’s output level, for  2 , 1 = i . The inverse 
demand for output is linear ()() 2 1 2 1 y y b a y y P + − = +  and firms have identical constant 
marginal production cost c, with  a c < . 
The production process generates pollution according to a constant emission-output ratio 
j k , for  2 , 1 = j , such that firm i’s emission level is  i i i y k e = . There are only two possible     5
technologies in this setting,  1 k and 2 k , with  0 ≥ j k  for  2 , 1 = j 2, and  1 2 1 2k k k ≤ ≤ 3; hence, 
1 k  is the cleanest  technology4. The technology is the only thing for which firms may differ 
one another: starting from an identical technology  2 k , each firm may decide to switch to 
the other and more efficient technology, bearing a sunk cost C . 
The government implements a market of emission permits in order to control pollution by 
firms. Because of this regulation, firm i must hold one permit to discharge one unit of 
emissions.  There is no possibility of abatement in this model: given the adopted 
technology  j k , the only way to reduce pollution is to cut production.  
The emission cap is fixed at E  and firms do not have any initial endowments of licences: 
both of them are buyers on the allowance market.  
We assume discrete time and an infinite horizon: firms  operate in both markets for an 
infinite number of periods. In each period, firms face the following decision problem: 
given the permit price5, firms engage in Cournot competition. The quantity choice implies 
a predetermined permit requirement, which depends upon the adopted technology. 
Hence, in each period and taking as given the permit price, each firm determines the 
demand for permits needed to produce its profit-maximising quantity of the good. The 
equilibrium allowance price, q, is derived endogenously by imposing a market clearing 
condition6, given the fixed permit supply and the factor demands for permits implied by 
the state of technology. Finally, output and profit levels are resolved. Aggregate emissions 
are fixed by definition at the level allowed by the total supply of licences.  
In the initial period, firms use the same production technology and an emission reducing 
technology becomes available for purchase. In each period, firm i may decide to pay a 
sunk cost C , investing in this new technology. Once a firm has adopted the cleanest 
available technology, it cannot return to the previous one, neither it can innovate further: 
                                                 
2 We assume that the constant marginal pollution is strictly positive, i.e. it is not possible to produce any unit 
of the commodity without polluting.  
3 This condition is imposed in order to assure existence and uniqueness of equilibrium.  If this condition is 
not met, the demand for permit of the most efficient firm may be upward sloping.  
4 Note that the subscript j does not necessarily mean that firm i adopts technology  i j = . 
5 Firms may have expectations upon permit price. 
6 We can think of an auctioneer who sells the permit at the market clearing price: given a price (previous 
period price or a price announced by the auctioneer), firms believe  they can purchase any amount of permits 
at that price and announce the quantities they will put on the output market; the auctioneer anticipates the 
factor demands for permits and announces the market clearing price (Requate, 1998).     6
hence, investment is irreversible and firms can innovate7 only once in their life. Therefore, 
in each period firms can face one of the following situations: 
-  State 0: they both use the least efficient technology  2 k ,  i . e .  n o n e  o f  t h e m  h a s  
innovated;   
-  State 1: only one of them has switched to the most efficient technology  1 k ; we 
assume that the innovating firm is firm 1, whereas firm 2 is the follower; 
-  State 2: both firms have adopted the best emission-output ratio  1 k . 
We first analyse the firms’ profit maximising decisions in each period and for each 
possible combination of production technologies, disregarding the technology choice. 
Then, we analyse firms’ investment decisions. In what follows the superscript  2 , 1 , 0 = s  
refers to the state, the subscript  2 , 1 = i  refers to the firm and the subscript  2 , 1 = j  refers 
to the emission-output ratio.   
When both firms use the same technology, they are identical in all respects and the 
solution of the model is analogous to the standard Cournot duopoly case. Let us consider 
state 0 (the analysis of state 2 is analogous). Each firm maximises its profits w.r.t. output 
i y for  2 , 1 = i :  
() [] i i i h i y y qk cy y y y b a
i
2 max − − + −  
Solving both firms’ maximization problem yields the equilibrium output levels8, the 
demand for permits (multiplying the optimal output quantities by firms’ technological 
parameter), and the equilibrium permit price. In state 0, the equilibrium permit price9 
will be positive only if 
0 0 α < < E ,  with  () [] b c a k 3 2 2
0 − = α ; in state 2, the  equilibrium 
permit price will be positive only if 
2 0 α < < E , with  () [] b c a k 3 2 1
2 − = α  and 
0 2 α α< : 
there are emission caps for which the adoption of a cleaner technology by both firms 
                                                 
7 We use the terms “innovation”, “adoption” and “investment” as equivalent, meaning that a firm change its 
technology paying a given cost. More rigorously, the term “innovation” is used to indicate the result of a 
research and development process, whereas “adoption” is used to denote the switch to a new technology 
which is already available on the market and can be used at some cost. (Tirole, 1998) 




1 − − = = , where the term 




1 k makes both firms’ output levels increase. 
9 The equilibrium permit price in state 0 is  []
2
2 2
0 2 3 ) ( 2 k Eb c a k q − − = .  The equilibrium permit price in state 
2 is  []
2
1 1
2 2 3 ) ( 2 k Eb c a k q − − = .                    7
drives the initially positive price to zero10. For the moment we make the following 
assumption: 
Assumption 1. The emission cap is such that 
2 0 α < < E .  
Assumption 1 implies that in case of both firms adopting  1 k  the permit price is strictly 
positive.  
Proposition 1. Under assumption 1, when both firms adopt the cleanest emission-output 
ratio  1 k , we have:  
-  if  
2 2 α β< < E , the equilibrium allowance price is lower than in state 0; 
-  if 
2 0 β < < E , the equilibrium allowance price is higher than in state 0; 
where  () ( ) 2 1 2 1
2 3 2 k k b c a k k + − = β 0 > . 
Proposition 2. Under assumption 1, when both firms adopt the cleanest emission-output 
ratio  1 k , it is 
0 2 π π> : firms’ (output and) profits are higher than when both firms adopt 
the least efficient technology11. 
Let us now consider the case in which only one firm has innovated (state 1). We assume 
that firm 1 has adopted the lowest emission-output ratio,  1 k , whereas the other firm 
produces discharging  1 2 k k > units of emission per unit of output.  Solving firms’ 
maximisation problem gives their output functions12. From the optimal output functions 
we can derive firm 1’s and 2’s demands for permits.   
Proposition 3. Let us denote  () ( ) [] () 0 2 1 2 1 2 1 > − − − = b k k c a k k k θ . If  θ ≤ E , the innovating 
firm becomes a monopolist on the output market, the other firm makes zero profit and is 
forced to exit (drastic innovation), otherwise both firms stay on the market (nondrastic 
innovation) and make strictly positive profits.  
                                                 
10 Notice that if the permit price is null, both firms produce an output quantity equal to  b c a 3 ) ( − . This is the 
standard result of a Cournot game with identical firms and linear output demand. It is the levels of output 
each firm would produce if there were no environmental regulation (Business As Usual, BAU). 
0 α and 
2 α are 
the level of emissions associated to the BAU level of output, when the emission-output ratio is  2 k and  1 k , 
respectively.  
11 Firms’ identical equilibrium profits are  ( )
2
2
0 2k E b = π
 
 and   ( )
2
1
2 2k E b = π , when both firms use the old 
and the new technology, respectively. Profits are constrained by the environmental regulation. 
12 Firm 1’s and firm’2 output functions (optimal output  levels as function of the permit price  q ) in state 1 
are  ( ) [] b k k q c a q y 3 2 ) ( 2 1
1
1 − − − =  and  ( ) [] b k k q c a q y 3 2 ) ( 1 2
1
2 − − − = , respectively.        8
We  focus  on  the case of nondrastic innovation. The equilibrium permit price13 will be 
positive for 
1 α < E , with  () ( ) [] b c a k k 3 2 1
1 − + = α 0 >  and 
0 1 2 α α α< < . Let us make the 
following assumption:  
Assumption 2. The emission cap is such that 
2 α θ< < E .  
Assumption 2 will be maintained throughout the analysis. Note that assumption 2 is 
stronger than assumption 1. 
Proposition 4. Under assumption 2, when only one firm adopts the cleanest emission-
output ratio  1 k , we have 




k k k ≤ < , it is 
0 1 q q < : the equilibrium allowance price is lower than in state 
0 whichever the emission cap is; 
-  if  2 1 3
2
k k > the equilibrium allowance price can be lower or higher than in state 0: 
-  it is 
0 1 q q < for  
2 1 α β< < E ; 
-  it is 
0 1 q q >  for 
1 β θ< < E ; 
with  () ( ) 1 2 1 2
1 3 2 bk c a k k k − − = β 0 >  and 
2 1 β β< . 
Proposition 5. Under assumption 2,  
-  if  ε θ< < E , it is 
0 1
2 π π< and 
1
1
2 π π< : innovation by one firm hurts the other firm, 
whether the firm that adopts  1 k is the first or the second one to do so; 
-  if 
2 α ε< < E , it is 
0 1
2 π π> and 
1
1
2 π π> :  innovation by one firm benefits the other firm 
whether the firm that adopts  1 k is the first or the second one to do so; 
where  () ( ) 0 1 2 2 1 > + − = b k k c a k k ε  and 
2 1 α ε β< < . 
Proposition 6. From assumption 2 and propositions 2 and 5, there are two possible 
ranking of per-period profits: 




1 π π π π> > > ; 





2 π π π π> > > . 
                                                 





1 2 3 k k k k Eb k k c a q − − − − − = .         9
Proposition 7. Under assumption 2,  




1 π π π π− > − ; 




1 π π π π− < − . 
In general, taking the permit price as fixed, the adoption of a cleaner technology makes it 
more convenient for a firm to increase its output level. Whether the firm is the leader or 
the follower or both firms innovate simultaneously, innovation cuts overall production 
costs by reducing permit requirement and expenditure on licence purchase per unit of 
output: given the price, a reduction in the emission-output ratio is equivalent to a 
decrease in the marginal cost.  Hence, when only one firms adopts the new technology, 
innovation enables it to increase its market share and profits at the expense of its rival. 
Despite the higher average abatement by the innovating firm, the allowance price may or 
may not decrease, depending on the emission cap and on the technology combination 
( 1 k , 2 k ): the smaller the permit supply is, the bigger the innovation effort must be in order 
to determine a sufficient decrease in permit requirement and thus a fall in the permit 
price. Consequently, the non-innovating firm may be advantaged by the other firm’s 
investment: the lower licence price may enable it to increase its production and profits, 
without investing in a cleaner technology. However, firm 2 can exploit the price drop only 
if this drop is sufficiently large. This happens for  ε > E . On the other hand, if firm 2 
follows and adopts the new technology (state 2), its output level is always higher than in 
state 1, whereas firm 1’s production may go up or down. As for the non-innovating firm in 
state 1, when imitation14 occurs the firm that has innovated first may benefit from 
imitation and may increase its output (and profits) in state 2 if the permit price 
decreases sufficiently. The condition for this to occur is again  ε > E . Finally, if  ε < E , the 
increment in per-period profits a firm can get by adopting first is higher than the 
increment in profits it can get by being second. The opposite occurs if the permit supply 
is sufficiently large. 
Till now we have considered the output decisions of firms given their technology. In the 
following section we consider firms’ decisions of investing in a cleaner technology. This 
strategic decision depends upon the ranking between per-period profits.  
 
                                                 
14 We will say that a firm imitates when it is the second to adopt the new technology, i.e. when it is the 
follower.      10
3 The game 
In analysing the strategic investment decision, we assume discrete time and an infinite 
horizon. Let us consider the following game, with two players, firm 1 and firm 2, choosing 
between two possible actions in each period, “innovate” and “not innovate”. In every 
period t, each firm has the possibility of adopting the best available technology  1 k if it has 
not already done so, incurring in a once-for-all cost  C . If neither firm has innovated at 
time  t, each one can still decide to do so in the next period, facing the same decision 
problem at time  1 + t . 
Hence the game ends when both firms have changed their technology, either because 
they decided to do so at the same time or because one firm has innovated at a given time 
and the other has chosen to follow15. Since each decision implies a flow of profits, in 
making their choice in each period, firms must consider this profit flow over their infinite 
life, discounted with a discount factor  ρ ,  1 0 < <ρ . Firm i’s payoff associated to a given 
combination of firms’ actions is its respective lifetime profit as viewed from the beginning 
of the period16. 
If both firms decide to adopt technology  1 k , they get a profit flow of π2 for all the 











If one firm has innovated (firm 1), the other one (firm 2) must decide whether to follow or 
not in the next period. Firm 2’s action is chosen solving a single firm optimisation 
problem. Considering two arbitrary periods,  t  and  1 + t , firm 2 will adopt the best 
technology in period t rather than in the next one if it gets higher lifetime profits by doing 













































                                                 
15 The game ends since in this case players have no strategic decision to take, but they continue to get their 
per-period profits for the rest of their life.  
16 Both firms know that if they will be playing the game at an arbitrary time t, it would be because they will 








z ρ π  and they will keep this 
profit for the periods thereafter, whichever decision they will take at time t. This part of firms’ payoff will not 
affect their choice between innovating or not.     11




2 1 π π ρ− < − C   (2) 
Condition (2) means that the extra profit firm 2 would get if it followed in each period  t 
rather than the next one, is higher than the savings in the cost due to one period delay.  
Proposition 8. Let us denote  ( ) () ρ π π− − 1
1
2
2  as  C . If firm 1 innovates, then the other 
firm either adopts the new technology immediately next period or never, depending on 
the investment cost. Two cases are possible: 
a)  quick imitation: if  C C < , firm 2 innovates immediately after the other one has; the 












   












           
(4) 
respectively, since state 1 will last only one period and firms pass to state 2; 
b)  infinite delay: if  C C > , firm 2 always delays adoption  (never adopts); the lifetime 




















                         
(6) 
respectively, since state 1 will last forever.  
If neither firm has innovated at time t, the game is repeated the next period. The number 
of periods the game will last is potentially infinite: the game stops (but the profit flows 
continue) if one or both firms innovate, since when only one firm has innovated the other 
either follows immediately or never. Therefore, in each period the payoff  
0 Π  that each 
firm gets if no one innovates, depends on what firms will do in the following period(s).  
Since we solved the part of the game involving only one firm’s decision, we can represent 
the “innovation” game as a symmetric game with two identical firms-players and two 
actions (“innovate” and “not innovate”) in each period, and with payoffs equal to lifetime 
profits, net of the investment cost. There are two games, one for the “quick imitation” 
case and one for the “infinite delay” case.  
We can solve the game looking at each subgame, i.e. looking at every period in which 
neither player has already innovated. Our aim is to solve the game for a stationary (i.e. 
time independent) Nash equilibrium, possibly involving mixed strategies. If such a     12
symmetric stationary equilibrium exists, it is subgame perfect, since all subgames in 
which both firms can make a choice have the same structure and payoffs.  
I n  o r d e r  t o  s e e  w h e t h e r  a  s t a t i o n a r y  e q u i l i b r i u m  t o  t h i s  g a m e  e x i s t s ,  w e  s t a r t  b y  
considering each subgame and analysing the possible relationship between payoffs, 
implied by the output and permit market equilibria.  
In the quick imitation case, it is 
1
2
2 Π > Π  by propositions 6 and 8. If it is also 
0 1
1 Π > Π ,  
“not innovate” is a strictly dominated strategy for both firms, and the unique possible 
equilibrium is a symmetric Nash equilibrium (innovate,  innovate): both firms innovate 
straight away in the first period and the game ends. If it is 
0 1
1 Π < Π , neither firm has a 
strictly dominated strategy and there are three equilibria: two symmetric Nash equilibria 
in pure strategies, in which both firms either innovate straight away or never, and one 
symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies. 
In the infinite delay case, it is 
1
2
2 Π < Π  by propositions 6 and 8. If it is also 
0 1
1 Π < Π ,  
“innovate” is a strictly dominated strategy for both firms, and the unique possible 
equilibrium is a symmetric Nash equilibrium (not innovate, not innovate).  If it is 
0 1
1 Π > Π , 
neither firm has a strictly dominated strategy and there are three equilibria: two 
asymmetric Nash equilibria in pure strategies, in which a firm innovates straight away 
and the other never does, and one symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies.  
Therefore, a mixed strategy equilibrium is a possible solution to this game in both the 
quick imitation and the infinite delay cases. Whether or not this equilibrium actually 
arises depends crucially on the parameters, since they affect both per-period and lifetime 
profits. We will focus on the effects of the emission cap and of the investment cost on the 
equilibrium, since these are the parameters that the environmental regulator might 
adjust in order to speed up the diffusion of cleaner technologies. In order to determine 
the critical values of these parameters, we will solve the game assuming mixed strategies 
and then we will see for which values of E  and C  this assumption is correct. 
There is a mixed strategy equilibrium for each subgame if there are a probability  1 p  and 
a probability  2 p  such that firm 1’s strategy “do not innovate with probability  1 p  and 
innovate with probability () 1 1 p −  (conditional on not having innovated before)” is the best 
response to firm 2’s strategy “do not innovate with probability  2 p   and innovate with     13
probability  () 2 1 p −  (conditional on not having innovated before)”, and viceversa. Since 
firms are identical, it is  p p p = = 2 1 .  
Let us consider firm i ’s point of view and assume that the other firm plays in each period 
the strategy  () p p − 1 ,.   If firm i  assumes this, it will innovate in a given period t if the 
expected payoff of doing so is higher than the expected payoff of not innovating, and 
viceversa. Firm i ’s expected payoff of innovating and of not innovating are 
2 1













    (8) 
respectively17.  
Both  N V  and  I V  are functions of  p , and their exact forms depend on whether there is 
quick imitation or infinite delay.  Each firm’s optimal mixed strategy is determined 
solving  I N V V =  for  p . Let us denote this solution as 
* p . Hence, if a symmetric mixed 
strategy equilibrium exists, it is such that in any period both firms do not innovate with 
probability 
* p and innovate with probability ( )
* 1 p − . 
It can be noticed that  I N V V = yields a quadratic expression in  p . We solved this equation 
for  p  for both the quick imitation and the infinite delay cases
18. It can be shown that in 
both cases, there are values of the investment cost  C  and of the emission cap  E  for 
which a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium  ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * 1 , , 1 , p p p p − −  actually exists.  
                                                 
17 
N V  is determined considering that: 
-if at any time t  one firm innovates, which happens with probability ( ) p − 1 , the other firm gets 
1
2 Π ; 
-if one firm does not innovate, which occurs with probability  p , the other firm gets 
0 π  for the current period and the 
expected value of not innovating for the future periods, discounted with the discount factor ρ .  
18 The solution for the quick imitation case is  
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
 
 − − − − + − + − + − + − = C p . The second root 
of the equation 
I N V V = is in the range between 0 and 1 only for  C C > , which implies that the infinite delay 
lifetime profits should be considered. The solution for the infinite delay case is  
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The second root of the equality 
I N V V =  is in the range between 0 and 1 only for  C C ~ > , which implies that 
innovation should never occur, as we will see later.     14
Let us define C ˆ  as the minimum value of the investment cost required to have a mixed 
strategy equilibrium in the quick imitation case, where  () [] () ρ π π ρ π π− − − − = 1 ˆ 2 1
1
0 1
1 C . 
Proposition 9. In the quick imitation case, the following equilibria arise: 
-  if  C C C < < ˆ , there are a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium 
( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * 1 , , 1 , p p p p − −  and two symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria (not innovate, 
not innovate) and (innovate, innovate);  
-  if  C C ˆ < , there is a pure strategy equilibrium (innovate, innovate) in every period.  
Hence, proposition 9 implies that each firm innovates for sure if the benefit of waiting for 
one period (savings in the investment cost obtained by delaying of one period the 
adoption of  1 k ) is lower than the forgone profits of being first (extra-profit of being the 
first to adopt the new technology, net of the profit decrease caused by imitation). Indeed, 
for  C C ˆ < the probability is not defined and we can conclude that there is a pure strategy 
equilibrium (innovate, innovate)19. On the other hand,  C C C < < ˆ implies that if the cost 
savings of waiting is higher than the opportunity cost of being first but lower than the 
opportunity cost of being second (recall proposition 8), each firm can do better by 
waiting for the other to invest and investing with one period delay20. Therefore, the mixed 
strategy equilibrium arises when firms are afraid of failing in coordinate themselves on 
the Pareto dominant outcome (not innovate, not innovate): the mixed strategy outcome is 
worse than the pure strategy (not innovate, not innovate), but it is better than the pure 
strategy (innovate,  innovate) There is a discontinuity21 at  C C ˆ = , as it is evident from 
Figure A1.1 (Appendix 1). 
                                                 
19 For each firm it is 
I N V V <  either if the other firm innovates for sure or if it does not. If one firm adopts 
1 k  
with certainty, the other firm’s expected payoff of not innovating collapses to 
1
2 Π , whereas its expected payoff 
of innovating degenerates to  2 Π , with  1
2
2 Π > Π . If one firm does not adopt the new technology for sure, the 
other firm’s expected payoff of not innovating is  ( ) ρ π− 1
0 , whereas its expected payoff of innovating 
degenerates to 
1
1 Π , with  () ρ π − > Π 1
0 1
1  for  C C ˆ < . 
20 Indeed, each firm would be better off if they both continue to use the old technology forever (since it is 
( )
2 0 1 Π > − ρ π ), but if one adopts 
1 k the other one has to follow in order to limit its loss. 
21 For  C C ˆ = the solution to 
I N V V = , is  1
* = p , implying that for this value of the investment cost there is a 
pure strategy equilibrium (not innovate, not innovate) in every period.     15
Proposition 10. In the quick imitation case, when a mixed strategy equilibrium arises, the 
probability of not innovating 
* p
  is decreasing in the investment cost  C , other things 
being equal.  
Proposition 10 says that it is more likely to adopt the best technology when the 
investment cost gets higher. This result seems counterintuitive.  One  possible 
explanation may stems from the incentive to play a  mixed  strategy in  the  quick 
imitation case: each firm would like to be the only one to adopt the new technology but 
knows that it will be followed. When the investment cost is higher, both firms have a 
greater incentive to wait and see whether the other invests: a firm must (“threaten” to) 
innovate with a higher probability in order to leave its rival indifferent between innovating 
or not.   
Let us now consider how the mixed strategy equilibrium changes with the emission cap 
E .  
Proposition 11. In the quick imitation case, the following equilibria are feasible : 
-  if  ε ε< < E , there are a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium  ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * 1 , , 1 , p p p p − −  
and two pure strategy Nash equilibria (not innovate,  not innovate) and (innovate, 
innovate), provided that  C C C < < ˆ , 
-  if ε < E or  ε > E , there is a pure strategy equilibrium (innovate,  innovate) in every 
period22.  
First of all, changes in the emission cap affect the mixed strategy equilibrium because 
they affect the critical cost range. It  can  be   C C C < < ˆ  only  for   ε ε< < E .  For   E  
outside of this range, the relative magnitude of per-period profits is such that the net 
benefit of  being first (extra per-period profit, net of the profit decrease caused by 
imitation) is always greater than the benefit of being second23. 
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ε  and  ε  is higher or lower than θ  depending on the discount 
factor and on the technology parameters. 
23 Recalling proposition 7:  
-  if  ε ε< < E , the decrease in per-period profit caused by being followed partially compensates the extra-
profit of innovating first, so that a firm can get an higher increment of the per-period profit by adopting 
1 k with one period delay: there exist investment cost  C C < such that the cost savings of waiting is higher than 
the extra-profit of being first but lower than the extra-profit of being second and a mixed strategy equilibrium 
is feasible;     16
Proposition 12. In the quick imitation case, when a mixed strategy equilibrium arises, the 
probability of not innovating 
* p
 is increasing in the emission cap  E , other things being 
equal.  
When the permit supply increases, the benefit of adopting the new technology increases 
slightly more than the expected value of not innovating; hence, the incentive to adopt 
increases accordingly, even though the best outcome for both firms is still associated to 
both staying with the old technology. A firm must thus (“promise”) not to innovate with a 
higher probability in order to leave its rival indifferent between innovating or not   
We will now consider the infinite delay case. Let us denote C
~ the maximum value of the 
investment cost for which a mixed strategy equilibrium arises in the infinite delay case, 
where  () () ρ π π− − = 1
~ 0 1
1 C .        
Proposition 13. In the infinite delay case, the following equilibria may arise: 
-  if  C C C
~ < < , there are a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium 
( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * 1 , , 1 , p p p p − −  and two asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria (innovate, 
not innovate) and (not innovate, innovate);  
-  if  C C
~
> , there is a pure strategy equilibrium (not innovate, not innovate)24.  
Hence, proposition 13 implies that each firm does not innovate if the benefit of waiting 
for one period are higher than the forgone profits of being first25. Indeed, for  C C
~
>  the 
probability is not defined and we can conclude that there is a pure strategy equilibrium 
                                                                                                                                                              
-  if  ε < E (the emission cap is sufficiently strict), the extra-profit of innovating first net of the decrease in 
per-period profit caused by being followed is higher than the extra-profit of being second: for every  C C <  the 
cost savings of delaying adoption of one period are lower than the extra-profit that can be realised by 
adopting technology 
1 k , and firms innovate straight away; 
-  if  ε > E  (the permit supply is sufficiently large), the extra-profit of being second is higher than the extra-
profit of being first; however, imitation leads to an increase in the per-period profit of the first adopter,  so 
that being first is still better: as before, for every   C C <  the cost savings of delaying adoption of one period 
are lower than the extra-profit that can be realised by adopting technology  1 k , and firms innovate straight 
away. 
24 For  C C = , it is  0
* = p . However, as for quick imitation, we leave this case undetermined, since C is the 
value of  C   for which the non-innovating firm should be indifferent between adopting the new technology 
immediately in the next period or never. For some values of  C C
~ > , there are two solutions to the equation 
I N V V = which implies that there is no mixed strategy equilibrium. However, for  C C
~ >  it is  () () 0 0 I N V V >  and 
() () 1 1 I N V V > :  there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium (not innovate, not innovate). 
25 In this case, the other firm will not follow, and the innovating firm does not incur in a reduction of its extra-
profit in the following period.        17
(not innovate, not innovate)26. Therefore, the condition  C C C ~ < <  implies that if the cost 
savings of waiting is lower than the opportunity cost of being first, provided that the 
investment cost is sufficiently high to avoid imitation (recall proposition 8), each firm can 
do better by trying to be the first and only one to adopt the new technology, i.e. by 
preempting its rival. Each firm can find it convenient to play a mixed strategy in order to 
confuse its rival and to be able to reach the innovator’s payoff. The mixed strategy 
outcome is worse than the pure strategy one (innovate, not innovate), but it is better than 
the pure strategy one (not innovate, innovate). There is a discontinuity at  C C
~ = , as it is 
evident from Figure A1.2. 
Proposition 14. In the infinite delay case, when a mixed strategy equilibrium arises, the 
probability of not innovating 
* p is increasing in the investment cost C , other things being 
equal. 
This is a more intuitive result than we have for the quick imitation case. If the investment 
cost increases, the advantage of being the first to adopt the new technology decreases; 
hence, both the incentive to invest for preemption and the probability of innovating 
decrease accordingly. 
Let us now consider how the mixed strategy equilibrium changes with the emission cap 
E .  
Proposition 15. In the infinite delay case, the following equilibria are feasible: 
-  if  ε < E , there are a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium  ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * * 1 , , 1 , p p p p − −  and 
two asymmetric pure strategy Nash equilibria (innovate, not innovate), provided that it 
is also  C C C ~ < < ; 
-  if  ε > E , there is a pure strategy equilibrium (not innovate, not innovate).  
First of all, changes in the emission cap affect the mixed strategy equilibrium because 
they affect the critical cost range. It can  be  C C C ~ < <  only  for   ε θ< < E .  For   ε > E , 
                                                 
26 For each firm it is 
I N V V >  either if the other firm innovates for sure or if it does not. If one firm adopts 
1 k with certainty, the other firm’s expected payoff of not innovating collapses to  1
2 Π , whereas its expected 
payoff of innovating degenerates to  2 Π , with  2 1
2 Π > Π . If one firm does not adopt the new technology for 
sure, the other firm’s expected payoff of not innovating is  ( ) ρ π− 1
0 , whereas its expected payoff of 
innovating degenerates to  1
1 Π , with  () ρ π − < Π 1
0 1
1  for  C C ~ > .     18
the relative magnitude of per-period profits is such that the benefit of being first is always 
lower than the benefit of being second27.  
Therefore, the mixed strategy equilibrium arises when the switching cost and the 
emission cap  are such that the payoff profiles imply a preemption game: each firm gets 
the highest payoff if it is the only one to innovate, and the lowest payoff if both do. 
Proposition 16. In the infinite delay case, when a mixed strategy equilibrium arises, the 
probability of not innovating 
* p
 is decreasing in the emission cap  E , other things being 
equal.  
This may appear counterintuitive. However, an increase in the permit supply, provided 
that it is not excessive (such that the condition ε < E is met) makes the innovating firm’s 
profit higher: the incentive to adopt first becomes stronger and then the probability of 
innovating goes up. 
Appendix 2 reports a numerical example.  
 
4 The Experiment 
We designed and implemented an experiment that replicated the “innovation game” 
described in the previous chapter. The experiment was computerized using the Z-Tree 
software developed at the University of Zurich by Urs Fischbacher. 
As in the “innovation game”, the decision problem involves two subjects, representing the 
two duopolistic firms. Subjects play a dynamic game that ends after a random number of 
periods; we will explain later how subjects’ decision problem in this setting is equivalent 
to the theoretical decision problem over an infinite horizon. In the initial round of the 
game, the two players are both in a state that we denote as “state A”, which is associated 
with a symmetric combination of payoffs. Players have to decide whether to remain in 
“state A” or to switch to a state denoted as “state B”.  Once a player has decided to 
                                                 
27 Recalling proposition 7:  
-  if  ε < E , there exists an investment cost  C C
~
< such that the cost savings of waiting for one period are 
lower than the forgone extra-profit of being first,  provided that the investment cost is sufficiently high to 
avoid imitation:  a mixed strategy equilibrium is feasible; 
-  if  ε > E  (the permit supply is sufficiently large), for every   C C >  the cost savings of delaying adoption of 
one period are higher than the extra-profit that can be realised by adopting technology 
1 k , and firms never 
innovate.       19
change state, he\she cannot return to the previous one. Each combination of states is 
associated with a combination of payoffs. Hence, “state A” corresponds to the old 
technology and “state B” corresponds to the new technology. The decision of moving 
from A to B corresponds to the decision of innovating. We leave the setting as abstract as 
possible, not using the words “technology” and “innovation”, in order to avoid any 
influence that this wording might have on subjects.  
When deciding to change state, players incur in a once-for-all cost, which is deducted 
from their payoff. It is not explicitly stated that there is a switching cost; however this is 
evident from the payoff structure: players know their net payoffs associated to their 
decisions, so that they do not need to make any calculation to determine what they will 
be paid.  
Subjects are paid the payoff corresponding to the combination of states they are in when 
the game finishes. The number of rounds is randomly determined and subjects do not 
know which round is going to be the final one. Each player’s decision problem ends when 
he\she has already moved from A to B, even though the game continues until the 
randomly determined number of rounds is over. The switching cost is incurred only once, 
in the round in which a subject decides to move from A to B: only if this round happens to 
be the final one, the subject that has moved will get a lower payoff (i.e. it will pay the 
once-for-all-cost), otherwise the subject will get the “full” payoff. In the instructions, all 
the payoffs are referred to as being potential, unless they are the payoffs corresponding to 
the state the subjects are in when the game ends (actual payoffs).  
The instructions of the experiment are reported in Appendix 3. These instructions refer to 
the first treatment: instructions are the same for all the treatments, except for payoffs. 
Let us now consider the equivalence between the experimental design, in which the game 
ends according to a random stopping rule, and the theoretical game, in which each firm’s 
life is infinite. In the theoretical analysis, firms discount their per period profits and the 
investment cost with a discount factor  ρ  in order to determine their lifetime profits. In 
the experiment, there is a probability λ   that the game ends at each round, and a 
probability () λ − 1  that the game will go on to the next period28. Let  t Π  denote the payoff 
that the subject would get if the game finished in period t. Then, as viewed from period 1 
                                                 
28 Whichever the period players are in, they know that the game will finish after a finite number of repetitions 
but they do not know when: the number of rounds that remains to be played could be very large.       20
the probability of the game stopping in period 1 (and getting  1 Π ) is λ , the probability of 
it stopping in period 2 (and getting  2 Π ) is  () λ λ− 1 , the probability of it stopping in period 
t    is  ()
1 1
− −
t λ λ . Hence, considering a stream of payoffs  1 Π ,  2 Π ,…,  t Π ,  each player 
expected payoff is 








t λ λ                                                (9) 
Therefore, a discount factor  ρ in theory is equivalent to a probability  () λ − 1  that at each 
round the game continues to the next one. The theoretical decision problem is to choose 
whether and when innovate in order to maximise the stream of future per period profits. 
In the experiment, a subject has to choose whether and when to change state in order to 
maximise (9). The two decision problems are equivalent; the only difference is the scaling 
factor λ , which does not affect decision.   
In the experiment, the payoff functions and the probability λ  are common knowledge. At 
the end of any one round each subject is told his\her rival’s decision.   
We implemented 4 treatments, differing one another in terms of  the investment cost 
and\or the emission cap. Hence, C  and E  are our treatment variables. In particular, the 
values of C  are such that two treatments imply quick imitation and the other two imply 
infinite delay, and the values of E  are “high” for two treatments and “low” for the other 
two, as summarised in  Table 1.     21
Table 1 - Treatments 
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Appendix 3 reports the payoff tables of the 4 treatments, that were given to subjects 
together with the instructions.  The payoffs and the probability of the game stopping at 
any one round ( 1 . 0 = λ ) are all that subjects needed to know in order to reach their 
decision. 
Each treatment requires 9 subjects. 8 subjects, divided into 4 pairs, play the game 5 
times, each of which with a different opponent. Hence, each subject faces the decision 
problem underlined above with 5 different players, without knowing who they are. By 
making the subjects playing several times we aim at collecting a sufficient number of 
observations that allows us to evaluate whether each individual always adopts the same 
strategy or randomises. The “absolute stranger” matching29 should control for correlation 
between repetitions of the game: as far as strategic interaction is concerned, the strategy 
each subject chooses to play in a repetition should be independent on what happens in 
the previous one(s) since the subject pairs are different30. For the scope of the data 
analysis, we make the assumption that the 5 plays of the game in each treatment are 
independent one another. 
The ninth subject does not play the game, but is in charge of determining the number of 
rounds each of the 5 games lasts. We call this subject the “Round Determinator” 
(Allsopp, 2002).  The “Round Determinator” is elected by the subjects in each session 
and determines the number of rounds of each of the 5 repetitions of the game, as 
described in detail in the instructions. This number is not revealed to the other 
                                                 
29 The “absolute stranger” matching implies that at any game each subject plays with a new partner, who is 
not known, and two subjects would never play together more than once.  
30 However, the 5 games will always be correlated, because each subject gains experience from one game to 
the next (learning).     22
participants in the experiment, though the subjects can check that the Round 
Determinator has performed the job described31.  
The experiment consisted of 4 sessions, one for each treatment. All the sessions took 
place in the Laboratory of the Centre for Experimental Economics (EXEC), at the 
University of York. Participants in the experiment were all undergraduate students, 
except for two postgraduate students. There were no trial periods. 
Each game lasted 3-4 minutes depending on the number of rounds. At the end of the fifth 
play, the subjects were informed that the experiment was complete and were paid in cash 
and were then free to leave. Each session lasted between 25 and 45 minutes.  
Table 2 reports for each treatment the number of times in which one subject was in state 
A whereas the other was in state B and the number of times the subjects in A followed 
immediately or waited some rounds to switch to state B. A time lag equal to 1 round 
means that the subject that was in state A moved to state B immediately the following 
round; a time lag equal to 2 means that the subject that was in state A waited 1 round 
before switching to B, and so on.  The column labelled “never” reports the number of 
times that subjects who were in state A whereas their opponent was in state B were cut 
off in state A by the end of the game. We cannot be sure that if the game lasted longer 
they would have not moved.  
 
Table 2 – Time lags before following 
   Time  lag 
Treatment 
Subjects  in 
A when the 













1  7  5  0 0 0 0 0 2 
2  13  6  5 1 0 0 1 0 
3  13  7  2 1 0 1 0 2 
4  7  5  1 0 0 0 0 1 
 
No statistical analysis is needed to notice that subjects tended to quickly follow the 
player that had already moved in all the treatments: most observations are concentrated 
in time lags 1 and 2. There was a propensity to follow also in the infinite delay 
                                                 
31 In this respect, this mechanism has the advantage of being transparent. Another advantage is that the 
number of rounds is determined by someone other than the experimenter, hopefully leading to a higher “trust 
degree” towards the mechanism itself. Moreover, this method is easy to carry out. However, there is always 
the risk that subjects who are not familiar with probabilities might not understand the mechanism.     23
treatments, despite the fact that the expected benefits from switching were 35, 4, -26 
and -48 in treatments 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively32.  
A possible explanation to this behaviour might be that there was a herd behaviour 
component: the players that had not moved to state B might have just imitated their 
rivals thinking that if the other players had moved that was the right thing to do.  
Another possible explanation might be that subjects competed between each other: the 
players that had not moved were not willing to let their respective rivals earn more. 
Indeed, the risk of being caught by the end of the game was low and for a moderately risk 
loving person, this competitive (or “envy”) component might affect behaviour33.  
All the 4 subject pairs were in state A at least 20 times in each treatment, since in the 
first round of each of the 5 plays all the subjects started in state A. In treatment 1 and 4 
at least one subject in each subject pair moved to state B at the first round, whereas in 
the other two treatments some subject pair managed to coordinate on both not moving 
for more than 1 round. However, only in the 5th play of the second treatment a pair 
managed to coordinate on the (not move to B, not move to B) outcome, i.e. on the outcome 
with the highest expected payoff.  
10 players over all the treatments always chose to move to state B when both subjects 
were in state A. We regard these subjects as playing a pure strategy “move to B (innovate)” 
in any round. Let us denote these players as “type B subjects”.  To be more precise, 
these subjects could also have adopted a mixed strategy, but in those plays it happened 
that they picked the B decision. We do not have enough observations to be reasonably 
sure that these players adopted a pure strategy34.  On the other hand, there are no 
subjects that always chose to remain in state A, given that both players in the pair were in 
A .  H e n c e ,  w e  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  n o  s u b j e c t s  p l a y e d  a  p u r e  s t r a t e g y  “ not move to B (not 
innovate)”.   
Let us consider the probability of not moving to B over all the sample. Since we are 
interested in players’ choice when both could make a decision, the total number of 
                                                 
32 By switching state subjects could either gain an extra-profit with probability 0.9 or lose their payoff with a 
probability 0.1.   
33 If so, it might be interesting to run the experiment with a different parameter set, either increasing the 
probability that the game ends at each round, i.e. decreasing the discount factor, or reducing the difference 
between the payoff when both players are in state B and the payoff of the player that remains in state A. 
Another possibility is to do a treatment in which one of the players is the computer. 
34 It might be worthwhile to repeat the experiment and submit a questionnaire to subjects, asking them to 
describe their strategy, though this could change their behaviour 
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rounds in which both subjects were in state A represents the number of observations for 
each treatment, i.e. our sample sizes.  
From each treatment, we estimate the probability that at least one player decides to 
remain in state A when both players are in A, that is Pr{at least one remains in A | both in 
A}. Denote these probabilities as  4 3 2 1 ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ p p p p . Therefore,  τ p ˆ ,  4 ,..., 1 = τ , is the sample 
proportion between the number of times at least one player’s choice is A when both are 
in A, and the number of times both players are in A.  We are interested in testing the 
hypothesis that each treatment sample probability is not statistically different from the 
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is the usual z-score,  α c  is the () % 1 α −  critical value, and α  is the significance level. 
The results we get are summarised in the following table. 
 
Table 3 - Estimates of the probability of not moving to B over all the sample 
Treatment  n   τ p ˆ  
* p   z   Result 
1 40  0.25 0.84072 -10.2095 ** 
2 54  0.555556 0.66667 -1.73211  
3 54  0.611111 0.24572 6.236798 ** 
4 40  0.25 0.40506 -1.99767 * 
 
In table 3, each row refers to a treatment. The columns show, for each treatment, the 
sample size, the sample probability, the theoretical probability, the z-score, and the 
results we get in terms of rejecting the null hypothesis, respectively. By “*” and “**” we 
indicate that we reject the null hypothesis that the two probabilities are not statistically     25
different at 5%, and 1% significance level, respectively. If the cell reports no “star”, then 
for these two significance levels we cannot reject the null hypothesis.  
We estimate the probability of not moving to B excluding the type B subjects from the 
sample size of each treatment. As mentioned above, here we are making the assumption 
that the type B subjects played a pure strategy “move to B”; since no subject chose to 
stay in A in all the rounds in which both he\she and his\her opponent were in state A, 
there are no subjects who played a pure strategy “not move to B”. Hence, the players that 
are not type B are assumed to have played a mixed strategy. Since we are interested in 
the choice of the subjects that played a mixed strategy when both could make a decision, 
the total number of rounds in which both subjects (of this type) were in state A represents 
the number of observations for each treatment, i.e. our sample sizes. Therefore, the 
analysis is analogous to the previous one, with different sample sizes of the 4 treatments, 
25 1 = n ,  44 2 = n ,  49 3 = n ,  20 4 = n .  
For each treatment, let us denote the probability that at least one (mixed strategy) player 
decides to remain in state A when both (mixed strategy) players are in A as  τ p )
,  4 ,..., 1 = τ . 
As before,  τ p )
,  4 ,..., 1 = τ , is the sample proportion of the number of times at least one 
(mixed strategy) player’s choice is A when both are in A. The null hypotheses we want to 
test are 
*
0 : τ τ p p H = )
,  4 ,..., 1 = τ . As we did for the other estimated probability  τ p ˆ , we 
apply the rejection rule for a two-tailed hypothesis test and we summarize the estimation 
results in the following table, which is analogous to table 3. 
 
Table 4 - Estimates of the probability of not moving to B over the “mixed strategy” sample 
Treatment  n   p )
 
* p   z   Result 
1 25  0.4 0.84072 -6.0218 ** 
2 44  0.681818 0.66667 0.213152  
3 49  0.673469 0.24572 6.954958 ** 
4 20  0.5 0.40506 0.86494  
 
We can make the following considerations: 
a)  comparing the estimated probabilities  τ p ˆ and  τ p )
,  4 ,..., 1 = τ , we get the same results: 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the estimated probability is not statistically 
different from 
* p  only in treatments 2 and 4;     26
b)  comparison between quick imitation and infinite delay treatments: for the same 
permit supply, the probability of not innovating should be lower in treatments 3 and 
4, but the estimated probability follows this trend only for treatments 2 and 4, 
corresponding to the low permit supply; 
c)  comparison between high and low permit supply treatments: for the same cost, the 
probability of not innovating should be increasing in E   in the quick imitation 
treatments and decreasing in E  in the infinite delay ones, but the estimated 
probability does not fit this trend in any treatment. 
We conclude this section, observing that the most frequent final outcome was (State B, 
State B) in all the treatments. Subjects changed state more often then predicted by the 
theory, except than in treatment 3, and they generally followed if their respective 
opponents had switched to state B. Players appeared to be “attracted” by changing state 
for reasons that are out of the strategic structure. Both players in state B (in any period) 
is the Pareto inferior pure strategy equilibrium in the quick imitation case; hence, we 
conclude by saying that subjects failed in coordinating on the Pareto superior equilibrium 
in each period. On the other hand, both players in state B is not a pure strategy 
equilibrium in the infinite delay case, since in this case pure strategy equilibria are 
asymmetric. However, (B,B) is the most likely outcome when subjects play  a  symmetric  
mixed  strategy, where the probability of (B,B) arising in any period is   ( )( )
* * 1 1 p p − − , 
equal to 0.569 and 0.354 in treatment 3 and 4, respectively.  
 
Concluding remarks 
We have looked at the impact that a market of emission permits may have on the 
propensity of firms to invest in environmental friendly technologies. In particular, we have 
focused on the effects of the interaction between the output and the permit markets on 
firms’ investment decisions.  We have looked at the conditions under which the diffusions 
of a cleaner technology in a non-competitive setting is more likely to occur. In this 
respect, we aimed at deriving some suggestions for environmental regulators. We have 
addressed this problem from both a theoretical and an experimental point of view.  
In a non-competitive setting, firms’ investment decisions have a strategic component, 
since a firm can use the adoption of a cleaner technology to enlarge its market share in 
the industry at the expense of its rival. We modelled this strategic interaction as a two-    27
firm dynamic game, in which each firm has to choose whether and when to make an 
irreversible investment, that affects the infinite stream of its future profits. We solved this 
“innovation game” looking for symmetric stationary equilibria. We have seen that the 
stationary equilibria to this game crucially depend on both the cost of switching to the 
cleanest technology and the emission cap. Given the directions in which the investment 
cost and the emission cap affect the feasible stationary equilibria, an environmental 
regulator aiming at speeding up the diffusion of an environmental friendly technology has 
to adjust these variables in the appropriate manner. 
It is intuitive that, given the emission cap, subsidising the duopolists in order to lower the 
cost of changing technology will induce both firms to adopt the superior technology. 
However, we can expect this “diffusion” outcome only if the cost of switching is 
sufficiently low. In  particular, the cost must be such that the cost savings from delaying 
adoption are lower than the net benefits from being the leader.  
For some higher values of the investment cost, this “diffusion” outcome is only one of the 
possible outcomes. However, the control authority can still use the investment cost and 
the permit supply as instruments to push firms towards the most desirable outcome, 
from an environmental point of view. In particular, given the permits supply, the regulator 
should try to push the investment cost as close as possible to the critical value that splits 
the quick imitation and the infinite delay cases; this is the cost below which the savings 
from delaying imitation are lower than the gains from following and above which the 
opposite occurs. The closer is the switching cost to this value, the higher is the 
probability that any one firm innovates in a period. If the investment cost is above this 
critical value, the regulator can make joint adoption more likely by subsidising firms. 
Alternatively, given the cost, it can increase the permit supply such that the benefit from 
switching is higher than the benefit from delaying adoption. In this case the objective is to 
make innovation as profitable as possible, increasing both firms preemption incentive. On 
the contrary, if the investment cost is below this critical value, the regulator may expect a 
quick imitation and can push diffusion by taxing the investment! Alternatively, given the 
cost, it can decrease the permit supply. In this case the objective is to make firms afraid 
of being preempted, so that each firm is not induced to adopt because it will be better off 
by doing so, but it will be tempted to invest in order to avoid to be worse off if its rival     28
moves first. In other words, the regulator objective is to make more difficult for firms to 
coordinate on the non adoption outcome (without communication).   
For the cost and emission cap values for which the “diffusion” equilibrium is only one of 
the possible stationary equilibria, the diffusion is not the dominant outcome: firms could 
be better off by doing something else, either coordinating on non adoption or on an 
outcome in which only one adopts.  
Game theory does not help us in predicting which outcome will actually occur. In 
particular, not necessarily firms will manage to coordinate on the Pareto superior one. An 
experimental investigation can help us in seeing this.  
Our pilot experiment provided interesting initial results as well as revealing some points 
in the experimental design and parameter set that could be worthy to revise.  The mostly 
observed equilibrium was not the Pareto dominant one. This result is consistent with 
other experimental investigations, which support the conclusion that a Pareto dominant 
equilibrium does not necessarily represent a focal one (Ochs, 1995).  
In interpreting these initial results we must pay special attention; in particular, we should 
consider the following: 
-  subjects might not have completely understood the round determination mechanism 
or they might not have believed it, so that this mechanism failed in inducing 
discounting: subjects looked at payoffs associated to each combination of states, 
rather than at the expected payoffs; 
-  subjects might well understood the random number of rounds in each play, but the 
probability of stopping the play at each round was too low, so that subjects did not 
consider the risk associated with changing state; 
-  the difference between payoffs corresponding to different outcomes is not striking, 
even though parameters lead to substantially different 
* p : probably, the experiment 
should be designed in such a way that it penalizes bad play sufficiently, especially as 
far the imitation choice is concerned; 
-  it is difficult to implement a mixed strategy. 
Further experimental sessions are needed in order to both provide a larger number of 
observation for statistical analysis and test subjects’ behaviour under different parameter 
sets. If these results prove to be robust to changes in parameter set and further 
experimental sessions, we could conclude that (innovate,  innovate) is the most likely     29
outcome of this “innovation game” when the permit supply and the investment cost are 
such that a stationary symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium may arise in any period.  
This is an encouraging result from the environmental regulator’s point of view. When, 
given the permit supply, the investment cost is sufficiently low that each firm can gain by 
adopting first, even if it anticipates that its rival would follow, the environmental regulator 
can “predict” that both firms will innovate straight away. If the investment cost is even 
slightly higher than this critical value, the outcome of the game will be “unpredictable”. 
The experiment focused on these “unpredictable” cases, showing that even in these cases 
the control authority does not need to worry too much, since firms’ behaviour will 
eventually lead to diffusion. The experiment results suggest that when quick imitation is 
expected, firms may fail to coordinate on not innovating, since for each of them the fear 
of the other innovating first apparently prevails. In the infinite delay case, when a 
preemptive equilibrium is the dominant one, the preempted firm does not apparently 
leave the other firm maintain this advantage position, and tend to imitate, even though 
for a firm (maximising its expected payoff)  would be better not to do so.  
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Figure A1.2 – Infinite delay: optimal probability of not 
innovating in terms of the investment cost,  () C p p
* * = , for 
fixed emission cap and technology parameters.     33
Appendix 2 – Numerical Examples 
Table A2.3 reports a numerical example for the quick imitation case, based on the 
parameters reported in Table A2.1. Table A2.2 reports the equilibrium permit prices, the 
per-period profits and the critical cost values implied by this parameter set. The 
equilibrium probability and the payoffs are calculated for increasing values of the 
investment cost C and for two different values of the permit supply E . The values of C  
are the same for the two emission caps.  
Table A2.1 - Parameters 
a   b   c  1 k   2 k   ρ   θ  
2 α   ε  
10 1  2 0.7  0.8  0.9  0.6222  3.733  2.987 
 
Table A2.2 - Permit price, per period profits and critical cost for two values of the permit supply 
E  
0 q  
1 q  
2 q  
0 π  
1
1 π  
1
2 π  
2 π   C   C ˆ   C
~
 
2 5.3125 5.2632 5.3061 1.5625 2.6051 1.1831 2.0408 8.5768 5.34710.4261
2.5 4.1406 3.9474 3.7755 2.4414 3.5239 2.1977 3.1888 9.9110 7.80810.8245
The following can be noticed: 
-  when the permit supply is higher, the critical values for the cost, C ˆ andC , 
increase; therefore for  5 . 2 = E  only the highest values of C leads to a solution 
between 0 and 1; 
-  the probability of not innovating 
* p is higher than in the infinite delay case; 
- 
* p  is decreasing in C and increasing in E ; 
-  lifetime profits and expected payoffs decrease with C and increase with E ; 
-  the expected payoff implied by 
* p is increasing in 
* p , and so it is decreasing in C ;  
-  the expected payoff of never innovating is constant; 















Table A2.4 reports a numerical example for the infinite delay case, based on the 
parameters reported in Table A2.1. The equilibrium probability and the payoffs are 
calculated for increasing values of the investment cost C and for two different values of     34
the permit supply E . The values of C are the same for the two emission caps. The 
following can be noticed: 
-  when the permit supply is higher, the critical values for the cost, C and  C
~
, 
increase; therefore for  5 . 2 = E only the highest values of C lead to a solution 
between 0 and 1 (for lower C , the game is a quick imitation one); 
-  the probability of not innovating 
* p is lower than in the quick imitation case; 
- 
* p is increasing in C and decreasing in E ; 
-  lifetime profits decrease with C and increase with E ; 
-  the expected payoff of never innovating is constant; 
-  the expected payoff implied by 
* p is increasing in 
* p , and so it is increasing in C . 








1 ) ( Π > > Π p V . 
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Table A2.4 - Infinite delay case: numerical example 
2 = E  5 . 2 = E  
C  * p  
1
1 Π  
1





  ( )
* p V  
* p  
1
1 Π  
1





  ( )
* p V  
8.8268306 0.0476502 17.224262 11.831333 11.581333  15.625  11.85022  -  26.411704 21.976762 23.060925 24.414063  - 
9.0768306 0.0956419 16.974262 11.831333 11.331333  15.625 11.871033  -  26.161704 21.976762 22.810925 24.414063  - 
9.3268306 0.1440352 16.724262 11.831333 11.081333  15.625 11.894113  -  25.911704 21.976762 22.560925 24.414063  - 
9.5768306 0.1929064 16.474262 11.831333 10.831333  15.625  11.91989  -  25.661704 21.976762 22.310925 24.414063  - 
9.8268306 0.2423546 16.224262 11.831333 10.581333  15.625 11.948923  -  25.411704 21.976762 22.060925 24.414063  - 
10.076831 0.2925115 15.974262 11.831333 10.331333  15.625 11.981955  0.0535876  25.161704 21.976762 21.810925 24.414063  21.990485 
10.326831 0.3435578 15.724262 11.831333 10.081333  15.625 12.020005  0.1353086  24.911704 21.976762 21.560925 24.414063  22.014314 
Table A2.3 - Quick imitation case: numerical example 
2 = E   5 . 2 = E  
C  * p  
1
1 Π  
1





  ( )
* p V  
* p  
1
1 Π  
1





  ( )
* p V  
5.5974562  0.9693337  15.375 14.51277 14.810707  15.625 15.357695  -  26.625377 25.858945 26.290299 24.414063  - 
5.8474562  0.9374234  15.125 14.28777 14.560707  15.625 15.089688  -  26.375377 25.633945 26.040299 24.414063  - 
6.0974562  0.9041042  14.875 14.06277 14.310707  15.625 14.820887  -  26.125377 25.408945 25.790299 24.414063  - 
6.3474562  0.8691712  14.625 13.83777 14.060707  15.625 14.551174  -  25.875377 25.183945 25.540299 24.414063  - 
6.5974562  0.8323644  14.375 13.61277 13.810707  15.625 14.280404  -  25.625377 24.958945 25.290299 24.414063  - 
6.8474562  0.7933453  14.125 13.38777 13.560707  15.625 14.008386  -  25.375377 24.733945 25.040299 24.414063  - 
7.0974562  0.7516596  13.875 13.16277 13.310707  15.625 13.734863  -  25.125377 24.508945 24.790299 24.414063  - 
7.3474562  0.7066719  13.625 12.93777 13.060707  15.625 13.459477  -  24.875377 24.283945 24.540299 24.414063  - 
7.5974562  0.6574457  13.375 12.71277 12.810707  15.625 13.181699  -  24.625377 24.058945 24.290299 24.414063  - 
7.8474562  0.6024948  13.125 12.48777 12.560707  15.625 12.900691  0.9924072 24.375377 23.833945 24.040299 24.414063 24.372833 
8.0974562  0.5391864  12.875 12.26277 12.310707  15.625 12.614966  0.9415823 24.125377 23.608945 23.790299 24.414063 24.105802 
8.3474562  0.4619046  12.625 12.03777 12.060707  15.625 12.321357  0.8872552 23.875377 23.383945 23.540299 24.414063 23.837599  
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 Appendix 3 – Instructions and payoff matrices  
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE EXPERIMENT 
Welcome to this experiment. The instructions are simple.  If you follow them carefully, 
you could make a considerable a m o u n t  o f  m o n e y ,  w h i c h  w i l l  b e  p a i d  t o  y o u  i n  c a s h  
immediately after the experiment. You should note that you should not talk to the other 
participants during the experiment. If you do, it will defeat the purpose of the 
experiment, and we will have to ask you to leave. 
The experiment consists of 5 plays of a game, each of which involves you and some other 
participant in the experiment. This other person will be changed between each play of 
the game, and you will never know who he or she is, and he or she will not know who you 
are. What you do in the experiment will not be divulged to anyone. 
The game is simple. It will last a randomly determined number of rounds. We will explain 
first how this number of rounds is determined, and then we will explain the structure of 
the game that you will be playing.   
The participants in the experiment will elect one of their number as the Round 
Determinator. This participant will be paid a fixed fee of £10 for participating in the 
experiment. The Round Determinator will not play the game but will determine the 
number of rounds in each game. He or she will do this as follows. Before each game the 
Round Determinator will go with one of the experimenters into the side office where 
there is an opaque bag containing 9 blue balls and 1 white ball. The Round Determinator 
will shake the bag and pick one ball from it at random, note the colour, and then replace 
the ball in the bag. He or she will do this repeatedly – until the white ball is drawn. The 
number of draws that is required is the number of rounds that the particular game will 
last. After the game, the Round Determinator will certify to the other participants that 
this procedure was followed, though obviously the Round Determinator will not confirm 
the number of rounds until after the game is finished. This procedure will be repeated 
for each of the 5 games.  You should note that this procedure implies that, at the end of 
any one round, there is a 1 in 10 chance that the game will finish after that round and a 9 
in 10 chance that the game will continue into the next round.   Note also that the number 
of rounds in a game will vary randomly from game to game. 
We now describe the game that you will be playing.  You, and the person with whom you 
are playing, start the game in a particular state, which we call State A. In any round of 
the game, you can choose to change to a new state, which we call State B. Once you have 
changed, you cannot change back. So the decision-problem is simple: all you have to 
decide is whether, and when, you want to change from State A to State B. The 
other person with whom you are playing has exactly the same decision problem.  In any 
round, you decide simultaneously, without knowledge of what the other player is doing. 
Please note that whichever the state you are in, the game will go on until it reaches its 
randomly determined end.   
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We now describe how you will be paid for participating in this experiment. You will 
receive a payment for each of the 5 games, and your payment for the experiment as a 
whole will be the sum of the payments for the 5 games. This final amount will be added to 
your participation fee of £2. 
In any one game the payment is determined in the following way. In each round of a game, 
you have a potential payoff. This depends on the state that you and the other player are 
in that round, and also whether you have decided to change state that round. If you have 
not  changed state in a particular round, then the following table gives your potential 
payoff in that round.  
If you have  changed state in a particular round, then the following table gives your 
potential payoff in that round.  
These potential payoffs are measured in tokens. The tokens you will earn during each 
game will be converted in cash at the end of the experiment at the conversion rate of 
1000 tokens for £1.   
At the end of each round you will be told in which state you and the other player are and 
what your and the other player’s potential payoffs for that round are.  
Your actual payoff in a particular game is simply given by your potential payoff in the 
round in which the game finishes.   
We repeat that your actual payoff for any game will be the potential payoff in the round 
in which the game finishes. If you have not changed state in that final round, the first 
 
If the other 
player is in State 
A 
If the other 
player is in State 
B 
If you are in  
State A 
1398 1315 
Your potential payoff 
if you have not 
changed state in this 
round 




If the other 
player is in State 
A 
If the other 
player is in State 
B 
Your potential payoff 
if you have changed 
state in this round  (You are in State 
B) 
170 0  
  38   
table above gives your actual payoffs; if you have changed state in that final round, the 
second table above gives your actual payoffs.  
On your desk you have a page titled “The Payoff Tables” reporting the two tables above. 
Your payment for the experiment as a whole will be the sum of your actual payoffs in all 
5 plays of the game, converted into  pounds (at the exchange rate of 1000 tokens = £1),  
plus the participation fee. 
If you are unclear about any aspect of these instructions, please raise your hand and one 
of the experimenters will answer your question. 
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If the other player 
is in State A 
If the other player 
is in State B 





if you have not 
changed state in 




If the other player 
is in State A 
If the other player 
is in State B 
Your potential 
payoff  
if you have 
changed state in 
this round 




If the other player 
is in State A 
If the other player 
is in State B 





if you have not 
changed state in 




If the other player 
is in State A 
If the other player 
is in State B 
Your potential 
payoff  
if you have 
changed state in 
this round 
(You are in State 
B) 
190 0  
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If the other player 
is in State A 
If the other player 
is in State B 





if you have not 
changed state in 




If the other player 
is in State A 
If the other player 
is in State B 
Your potential 
payoff  
if you have 
changed state in 
this round 




If the other player 
is in State A 
If the other player 
is in State B 





if you have not 
changed state in 




If the other player 
is in State A 
If the other player 
is in State B 
Your potential 
payoff  
if you have 
changed state in 
this round 
(You are in State 
B) 
127 0 